I recently posted something on X about Mo Gawdat’s framing of AI as the next leverage layer in human history. Hunter-gatherer to agriculture to industry to information to AI, with each transition rewarding whoever owned the automation beneath everyone else. I said the framing was good, that staying at the bleeding edge would require a kind of merger with the machines that most people won’t want, and that for the rest of us, life would probably get more prosperous and interesting, the way each previous jump made it.
That last part wasn’t quite right. Or rather, it was right in a way that almost everyone, including me in 280 characters, gets wrong. Let me try to do this properly.
Movement I: The Optimism Trap
The standard takes on AI sort into a few familiar buckets. Things will get better: Pinker, Kurzweil, the accelerationists. Things will get worse: the doomers, and the people who fear for their paychecks, who have a point I’ll come back to. Things will be mixed, but we’ll adapt: the Mo Gawdats of the world, lamenting the narrowing of the elite path while waving at general prosperity.
All of these takes share a hidden assumption: that the yardstick stays the same across the transition. They argue about whether the numbers go up or down, but the numbers themselves are inherited from the epoch that’s ending: material wealth, productivity, lifespan, professional status, cognitive capability. They’re the measures the Enlightenment taught us to care about, and the ones the whole knowledge economy was built to maximize. Every one of them is a measure of what slow, deliberate, analytical thinking can produce, the mode psychologists call System 2. (More on that term in a moment.)
Yardsticks follow scarcity. A society honors whatever it is short of, and for two centuries it was short of people who could reason carefully about complicated things. Make that reasoning abundant and the old numbers keep mattering. Nobody wants to be poor or sick. What they lose is the power to tell you which way to go. A floor is not a direction.
Measure the AI epoch with the old instruments and you get a story about disruption and adaptation, with the elite path narrowing and everyone else experiencing some mix of gains and losses. That’s Mo’s story. It holds on its own terms. The terms are what I think is about to break.
Movement II: The Civic at the Drag Strip
For the last two hundred years, civilization has been a drag strip, and the only car available to race on it was a Honda Civic.
The Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and the Information Age selected for and rewarded one particular kind of human cognition: analytical reasoning, symbolic manipulation, the ability to hold complex abstractions in working memory and run logical operations on them. Call it System 2 thinking. Call it Spock cognition, if you grew up on Star Trek. This is what universities credentialed, what professions selected for, and what the knowledge economy paid a premium for.
And it worked. System 2 cognition built the modern world. Science, engineering, law, medicine, finance and technology all run on explicit reasoning, and the whole institutional apparatus of credentials, hierarchy and reward was tuned to find the people who were good at it and put them where they had leverage.
But the Civic was never a race car. It was pressed into drag duty because nothing faster existed. Since late 2022, something faster does: a Top Fuel dragster of analytical capacity, on demand, with unlimited fuel and no fatigue. The Civic still runs. Its value on the drag strip is collapsing, and the strip itself is ceasing to be where the value lies.
The Civic was never a race car.
It was the only car
available.
The Honda Civic
Universities credentialed it. The knowledge economy paid a premium for it. It built the modern world. It was pressed into drag duty because nothing faster existed.
The Top Fuel Dragster
Unlimited fuel and no fatigue. The Civic still runs. Its value on the drag strip is collapsing, and the strip itself is ceasing to be where the value lies.
It’s worth being precise about which System 2 work collapses and which grows. Generic analytical work, the drafting, summarizing, boilerplate, mid-tier code, standard analysis and routine research, is being pushed toward near-zero marginal cost. That was the Civic’s old job, and the dragster now does it nearly for free. Architectural System 2 work grows more valuable: designing the constraints, the multi-agent workflows, the evaluation tests and the systems that direct what the dragster does and check what it produces. The shallow layer commoditizes. The deep layer amplifies.
At least for now. Architectural work is a high-leverage human skill today, and I doubt it stays that way; AI systems are already learning to design and orchestrate other AI systems. What I expect to last is narrower: deciding what is worth building at all, and answering for whether a system is doing the real work or only imitating its form. Movement VII returns to this.
None of this is painless. A great many people built their incomes and their self-respect on the Civic’s old job, mine included, and a change of yardstick does not pay a mortgage. That loss is real, and I have no policy to offer for it. This essay takes up a different question: what to aim at, once the thing we were all told to aim at is cheap.
What ends with it is the assumption that analytical altitude is the point. That assumption organized two centuries of credentials, hierarchy and reward. Its ending opens ground that was always more interesting than the strip we paved over it.
Movement III: What System 2 Was For
Here’s the move most people haven’t made yet. System 2 cognition was never the goal. It was the balloon.
You build a hot-air balloon to ascend. You ascend in order to see. As far as the balloon is concerned, the view is the point. Nobody confuses the balloon with the view. Nobody chrome-plates the gondola and calls it a destination. The balloon is disposable equipment for reaching a perspective you can’t get from the ground.
For two centuries, civilization mistook the balloon for the destination. We polished the gondola, licensed the pilots and built entire institutions around producing people who could fly. We forgot the ascent was supposed to enable something. We started treating altitude as the point.
AI commoditizes the balloon. Anyone can ascend now; analytical altitude is available to everyone, on demand. The skill of getting up there, which is what the educated class was selected for, is losing most of its market value, and losing it fast, at least in its generic form.
Cheap altitude has a cost that is easy to miss. When getting up there was hard, the climb answered the question of what to do with a life: get better at climbing. Schools, firms and professions were ladders, and a ladder tells you which way is up. Take away the difficulty and that borrowed direction goes with it. From altitude you can see a thousand places to land, and the machine will map a thousand more. Seeing them was never the hard part. Landing on one means giving up the other nine hundred and ninety-nine.
What survives is what you do with the view. Whether you can see. Whether you can hold what you saw, bring it back down, commit to it and build with it. That is what the balloon was always for.
Movement IV: The Activities That Matter
Ask what gives a human life meaning and you get answers like culture, exploration and sense-making: activities that connect us to something larger, engage our capacity for wonder, and let us take part in the long project of figuring out what it means to be here.
The modern yardstick translated these into System 2 terms. Culture became cultural production: books written, films made, papers published. Exploration became the discovery of new facts, territories and technologies. Sense-making became the construction of complete systems, theological or scientific. These are translations, and the originals are older.
Culture, before it is anything produced, is the lived experience of belonging to a tradition: committing to local meaning, taking part in rituals and practices that give a life its shape. A person embedded in a demanding local tradition may experience more belonging than a modern consumer with unlimited content, even when the embedded life is harder, less free and more constrained in every other way. The Marines I served with shared a thicker culture than most civilians experience in their adult lives. Military life was not better. It was bound. Culture is commitment, not content.
Exploration, before it is discovery, is the embodied act of attending to what’s there. The first time you really see a sunset. The moment a piece of music opens something in you. The face of someone you love. AI can map the space of protein structures at a scale no human lab could match. Whether it has experiences of its own is an open question I don’t need to settle here, because the argument doesn’t turn on it. The exploration that survives the AI epoch is the exploration of lived experience itself, the territory Rick Rubin and David Lynch spent their careers working.
This is where the easy reading of the argument fails. AI can already generate the artifacts of that territory: Rubin-style production, Lynch-style imagery, wabi-sabi-style poetry, Rothko-style color fields, the painted sunset. So retreating to feeling and intuition is no safe harbor. The machine produces things that move us faster than any human can.
The human edge isn’t some mystical residue of suffering that a listener’s nervous system detects in a human-made song. Sound waves don’t carry a certificate proving someone bled to make them. The edge lies upstream and downstream of the artifact, and in both places it comes down to who pays.
Upstream is choosing. The machine can generate any piece of work on demand, and it can rank the candidates too. I would not bet against its ranking getting very good. What it does not do is spend anything by choosing. A model can run every branch, keep every draft and start over without loss. A person gets one run. Every year given to this work is a year withheld from all the others, and it does not come back. To decide that this piece is what this moment calls for is to spend part of a finite life on it, in front of other people, with your name attached.
Downstream is discernment, and here I want to be careful. Telling whether a wabi-sabi poem is true to the tradition or only wears its surface is a judgment about the poem, and a judgment about the poem can in principle be learned by anything that has studied enough poems. The part that does not transfer is answering for the judgment: standing behind it, being wrong in public, and carrying that wrongness into the next decision because it cost you something. A system that improves against a metric revises its aim. A person who has been wrong at a price revises what they care about.
I am making a claim about what meaning is. I would rather say so than dress it up as a forecast of what machines will never do. If something artificial someday lives one unrepeatable life with real things to lose, the argument will apply to it too. It follows finitude wherever finitude is found.
AI can paint the sunset. It can paint ten thousand and tell you which one most people will prefer. It gives up nothing to paint any of them. That’s the human edge. Not magic in the artifact. Stakes in the loop.
What changes in the AI epoch is where System 2 sits. It moves from the center of prestige to the service of taste, judgment, commitment and embodied meaning. The balloon stays in the budget.
Movement V: Rubin, Lynch, Marcus
None of this is a new way of working. It’s an older arrangement, briefly forgotten. Three figures spread across nineteen centuries show the pattern.
Rick Rubin (born 1963) doesn’t write the songs and doesn’t play at the level of the artists he produces. He sits with the work and notices what is alive in it. His best-known decision was a subtraction. In 1993 Johnny Cash was a legacy act the industry had stopped listening to. Rubin sat him down in a living room with an acoustic guitar and recorded almost nothing else. American Recordings came out the following spring and revived Cash’s career. The call looks obvious now. Nobody else had made it. Behind it sat decades of pattern recognition operating below the level of words, backed by ruthless editorial discipline, and in front of it sat Rubin’s label and his name.
David Lynch (1946–2025) compared ideas to fish: the little ones swim in the shallows, the big ones deeper down, and you don’t manufacture them, you get quiet enough to catch them. He took up Transcendental Meditation in 1973 and kept at it daily for decades. For him it was professional equipment, because the receiver is the instrument. Then came the scripts, the edits, the financing and the brutal mechanics of making a film, which in the case of Eraserhead took five years.
Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE) wrote the Meditations as a private notebook, addressed to himself, while running an empire and managing military campaigns. It reads less like a philosophical treatise than a practice log: the same few insights restated hundreds of times, in slightly different forms, across years. The historian Pierre Hadot argued that the repetition is the point. These were spiritual exercises, and repetition is how a principle moves from something you know into something you are. My own guess is that this is also why the book still reaches people: nothing in it reads as performed.
Two facts about Marcus matter for what follows. He did not pick Rome. He was adopted into the succession as a teenager and spent the rest of his life at a post chosen for him. And he kept the largest question open. Again and again the notebook poses the same fork: either providence or atoms, either the universe is ordered or it is accident. Most scholars think he believed in providence. What the notebook shows is a man making his conduct hold in either case. He would do the work of his post in both universes.
The pattern holds across nineteen centuries and three very different trades. The activities that make human life meaningful begin below explicit reasoning, and then require discipline, repetition and form to be realized. In each case someone also put something on the line: a label, years of a life, a reign. The modern project of running these activities through analytical frameworks alone was a productive detour, and it is ending. What returns is the older order: lived judgment on top, analytical reasoning as its instrument, and now AI underneath as a cheap, tireless source of volume. The old knowledge economy put explicit reasoning at the top and treated intuition as raw material to be disciplined. When the instrument gets cheap, the commitment that directs it matters more.
Movement VI: The Meta-Modern Operator
There’s a name for the stance that fits the epoch we’re entering: meta-modernism. Scholars have mapped it, most influentially the cultural theorists Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker in their 2010 “Notes on Metamodernism,” but it hasn’t yet spread as a way of living. So let me give the working version.
It helps to see it as the third of three stances toward the big questions.
Modernism, roughly from the seventeenth century to 1945, believed that enough data and enough reason would eventually solve the human condition. Two world wars broke that faith. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, often read far beyond what they prove, became the emblem of its limits.
Postmodernism, roughly from 1945 into our own century, answered that if certainty isn’t available, nothing is real. Its cultural mood kept company with nihilism and atomization.
Meta-modernism is the third move. It says the game is rigged, certainty isn’t available, and we’re going to play beautifully anyway. Build local truths: bounded and contingent, held without proof, whether they operate at the scale of a tea ceremony or an empire. Commit to meanings while knowing they’re local in that sense. Use analytical sophistication in service of commitment rather than as a permanent escape from it. Ascend, get the view, come back down, and build with what you saw.
There is a problem buried in the word “chosen,” and I’d rather face it than step around it. I said the Marines had a thick culture because it was bound. A meaning I picked from a menu this morning, and can swap for another tonight, binds nothing. If choosing is cheap, the choice carries no weight. So how does a chosen meaning come to hold a person?
The answer I trust comes from enlistment. I chose once, at a recruiter’s desk. After that the choice was not reopened each morning. There was a contract, there were the Marines on either side of me, and there was a price for walking away. The choosing was free and the staying was not. Marcus is the same case from the other direction. He never chose Rome, and the notebook is, among other things, a record of him assenting to the post again and again.
A commitment in the sense I mean has both halves. You choose it, or you assent to what was handed you. Then you make leaving expensive: you say it in front of witnesses, you let people depend on it, you sink years into it that you cannot get back.
In practice the stance runs as a loop:
-
01Scan
Gather information until more gathering stops paying, or until time runs out, whichever comes first. The aim is sufficiency.
-
02Acknowledge
Admit you don’t have a God’s-eye view and never will. Stop pretending you do, and stop treating that as a reason not to act.
-
03Commit
Choose a value, a meaning: bounded, local, owned. Not proven. Chosen. Then bind it. Tell someone. Put your name on it. Let leaving cost you.
-
04Execute
Act with conviction. The conviction is real even when the certainty isn’t. Hesitation contaminates everything downstream of it.
-
05Iterate
When reality pushes back, change your methods freely and your commitment rarely. Methods are cheap to revise and should be. A commitment gets revised at full price, in front of the people it was made to. The discipline is correction without collapse.
This is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is a third stance, and most public argument hasn’t made room for it yet.
Movement VII: The Real Bet on AI
So here’s the take I should have written instead of the gloss I posted.
The AI epoch isn’t going to make life better in Pinker’s terms or worse in the doomers’ terms. It’s going to change which question matters.
The merger path Mo describes, staying at the bleeding edge by augmenting yourself with AI, is powerful but spiritually incomplete. It can raise your altitude. It can’t tell you where to land. People who take that path become faster Civics, optimizing for exactly the kind of cognition that just became cheap. My read is that most people sense this, and that their reluctance is more than a lifestyle preference. The path is pointed along the wrong axis.
The real bet is the meta-modern one. Let AI commoditize the balloon. Let analytical altitude become cheap. Then come down, and do the work altitude was always supposed to make possible.
In working life, that suggests a role. I call it the Orchestrator. The analyst trying to out-compute the machine has no future in it, and neither does the consumer passively taking in machine-made experiences. The Orchestrator works across three layers:
The human keeps the why; the machine takes the volume
The architectural work in the middle is where I see most of the leverage today, and it is the part most likely to be missed, both by accelerationists who think AI will handle everything and by doomers who think humans will be left with nothing. Over time I expect that middle layer to thin.
Now notice what I just did. Leverage, durability, which layer lasts: that is the old yardstick, and I reached for it within a page of saying it was breaking. I’ll let it stand, because people have to eat during a transition and the Orchestrator is my best answer to where to stand at work. But I don’t know that the top layer will be paid. Markets pay for scarcity, and commitment may turn out to be scarce in ways a market can’t price. The top layer is worth doing whether or not it turns out to be a job. That is the whole difference between the two yardsticks, and the four practices below belong to the new one.
Build things that transmit rather than explain. Stand in front of a Rothko long enough to feel what it’s doing; that’s the model. The painting doesn’t argue for anything. It puts you in a state. The best art goes around the analytical channel and delivers the experience directly. Much of the important work of this era will be building more things like that, games, rituals, communities, practices and places, that teach a way of living by letting people live it. The ones that last will also bind: a standing game night, a weekly practice, a table where people are expected.
Commit to local meaning while knowing it’s local. Marcus wrote often about how completely the courts and generations before his had vanished, and he gave no sign of thinking Rome exempt. He served it anyway. As far as anyone can tell the notebook was for his eyes only, and it is still being read nineteen centuries later. That’s the Marcus move, and it scales: do the work as if no one is watching, including any future AI that might someday read what you wrote, because performing for an imagined audience corrupts the work. Witnesses to a promise are a different thing from an audience for a performance. Take the first and refuse the second.
Become a better receiver. Sensitivity to aesthetic, emotional and ethical resonance is the real instrument of the next epoch, and my sense is that decades of institutional, goal-driven work blunt it in most of us. Sharpening it is unglamorous. Lynch sat in silence every day. A smaller version: return to one work, one place or one practice many times instead of sampling a hundred, and notice what has changed by the tenth visit. Then point the analytical power AI has made cheap at whatever that sharpened sense tells you matters.
Trust the descent. The view from altitude is real, but altitude doesn’t give it weight. Weight comes from coming back down and committing to specific, bounded realities, at the cost of every other place you could have landed, with honest humility about what we can know. My bet is that the builders, artists and early adopters who learn to come down will quietly build the scaffolding for what comes next, in the gaps the old institutions leave as they lose their grip.